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ABSTRACT 
The use of cyber security standards can greatly assist in the protection of process control systems by 
providing guidelines and requirements for the implementation of computer-controlled systems.  These 
standards are most effective when the engineers and operators, using the standards, understand what each 
standard addresses.  This paper provides an overview of several standards that deal with the cyber 
security of process measurements and control systems. 
INTRODUCTION
One of the first things a company needs to do when implementing a cyber security program is establish a 
cyber security policy.  This will be the foundation of all cyber security efforts in the future.  This policy 
should be founded on sound principles and practices, the kind that are found in industry standards. 
Much of the industry of the United States is dependent on the use of computers for their operation both in 
information technology (IT) and control systems.  These systems are at risk due to increasing cyber 
intrusions that impact normal operations.  Data from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (U.S. CERT) intrusion tracking site show a near-exponential increase in cyber attacks on IT 
systems over the last decade [1], and there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that attacks against 
the control systems of utilities and other critical infrastructures are also increasing [2].  This recognition 
of control system vulnerability to cyber attacks was emphasized by the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. [3] 
Industry is responding with an interest in how to address cyber threats to their critical control systems.  
The application of common, proven methods for vulnerability reduction, documented and shared in 
industry standards and guidelines, can be an important part of a strategy for achieving such reductions at 
an acceptable cost.  This paper presents a description of several documents, consisting of standards, 
technical reports, and guidelines, relating to the cyber security.  The goal of this paper is to assist users of 
control systems, especially those not familiar with cyber security standards, in providing an increased 
understanding of cyber security standards that influence the security of process control systems.   
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
Although the primary focus of this paper is on process control systems, several standards that apply to IT 
systems are also included because they are considered benchmarks in the area of cyber security.  While 
not written specifically for process control systems, they provide a starting point for developing 
organization guidance.  They offer guidelines and voluntary directions for cyber security management and 
provide a high level, general description of the areas currently considered important when initiating, 
implementing or maintaining information security in an organization. [4] 
Electronic intrusions are coming from both inside and outside of companies. [5]  Although many of the 
statistics referenced here deal primarily with IT systems, it would appear that attacks against control 
systems are increasing proportionally.  These intrusions come in the form of innocent mistakes by an 
operator, inappropriate testing by internal organizations, use of inappropriate security policies, attacks by 
disgruntled employees or former employees, viruses, and from external attackers.  Vulnerability of the 
control system to the external attacks has increased with increased external connections and with the 
increased use of commercial off the shelf technologies, for which exploits already exist. 
Many businesses, as they have become aware of the problems, have begun to respond to these security 
threats because of increased potential liability and threat of regulatory compliance.  Much of the problem 
can be reduced by application of security principles and practices contained in the cyber security 
standards.  Because of differences in systems, it is important to use the appropriate standards.  They can 
assist in understanding vulnerabilities in a system, help identify specific system problems, and suggest 
solutions.  For these standards to be of benefit, it is necessary to understand something of what each 
addresses.  
This document provides a reference at a point in time.  Cyber security standards are evolving at a very 
fast pace and hence it is necessary for the user to stay current on what standards exist and their current 
status.  This paper only presents a brief overview of some of the standards that exist, with an emphasis on 
those standards that address control system cyber security.   
STANDARDS
A few standards, relevant to control systems in addition to three IT-focused standards, are reviewed.
Several of these are standards, some still in draft form, others are reports or guidelines.  It is recognized 
that this is not a complete list of standards that deal with cyber security or even control system security, 
but this study can help identify those standards that might be of benefit to an organization that uses 
process control systems.   
The following sections present a brief description of the standards and their current status (as of January 
2006).  Table 1 provides a summary of the various standards addressed in this paper.  A more detailed 
analysis of the relationship of the requirements, presented in some of these standards, is contained in two 
reports: A Summary of Control System Security Standards Activities in the Energy Sector [6] and
Comparison Study of Industrial Control System Standards against the Control Systems Protection 
Framework Cyber-Security Requirements [7]. 
There is some uncertainty with the actual status of some of these documents.  A given document may be 
referred to as a standard in one reference and a report in another.  This may be due in part to the various 
levels of standards.  Informative standards provide goals that would assist in securing a system and 
suggested ways to meet these goals, but do not contain specific requirements, therefore they are much the 
same as a report.  On the other hand, Normative standards contain specific requirements that must be 
followed.  Therefore there is probably more difference between Normative and Informative standards 
than between Informative standards and reports or guidelines.  These designations are not critical to the 
application of the principles contained in the documents.  Although every effort has been made to 
determine the actual designation by the issuing organization, in some cases there may still be some 
confusion.
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AGA 12 – Cryptographic Protection for SCADA Communications General Recommendations
Scope: When completed, American Gas Association (AGA) Report No. 12 [8, 9] will consist of a 
series of documents recommending practices designed to protect Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) communications against cyber attacks by focusing on securing the communication 
link between the field devices and the control servers in the control center. [10]  It will define one part of 
a strategy to protect gas, water, wastewater, and electric utility SCADA systems from cyber attack by 
specifying a means of encrypting the serial data before they are transmitted through vulnerable media 
such as radio or telephone lines. [11]  Part 1. “Background, Policies & Test Plan,” will address the 
background, security policy fundamentals, and a test plan that generally apply to all areas of 
cryptographic protection of SCADA systems while Part 2. “Retrofit Link Encryption for Asynchronous 
Serial Communications,” will focus on retrofit link encryption for asynchronous serial communications.  
It will contain the functional requirements and detailed technical specifications for AGA-12-compliant 
retrofit devices.
Status:
Report
Not released - There are currently two parts of the standard, both in draft:  Part 1 is in the final stage of 
balloting and Part 2 is in first draft.  Additional parts are also planned. 
API 1164 – Pipeline SCADA Security 
Scope:  American Petroleum Institute (API) 1164 [12] is a SCADA security standard that provides 
guidance to the operators of oil, gas and liquid pipeline systems for managing SCADA system integrity 
and security.  It is specifically designed to provide the operators with a description of industry practices in 
SCADA security and to provide the framework needed to develop sound security practices within the 
operator’s individual companies.  It addresses access control, communication security (including 
encryption), information distribution classification, physical issues (including disaster recovery and 
business continuity plans), operating systems, network design, data interchange between enterprise and 
third-party support/customers, management systems, and field devices configuration and local access. 
[13]  Although the standard does address physical security, the primary thrust of this document is cyber 
security and access control. 
Status:
Standard - Informative 
Released – First Edition, September 2004  
CIDX - Guidance for Addressing Cybersecurity in the Chemical Sector, version 2.0
Scope: The Chemical Industry Data Exchange (CIDX) Guidance for Addressing Cybersecurity in the 
Chemical Sector, [14] describes in detail the key elements of a cyber security management system 
(CSMS) applicable to manufacturing and control systems, business IT systems, and value chain systems 
in the chemical sector.  It includes references to the Security Code, which provides cyber requirements 
and management practices for the chemical industry, as well as to other international and domestic cyber 
security guidelines and standards.  It provides best practices and guidance to include in corporate policies, 
procedures, and practices.  Actions for the protection of control systems and information for increasing 
awareness of the problems, are presented.  It attempts to provide practical guidance by first identifying the 
base-level set of functions key to a CSMS, followed by additional guidance known to be employed by 
some companies in the chemical sector. [14] 
Status:
Guidelines
Released – Version 2.1, May 2005  
IEC 62351 - Data and Communication Security
Scope:  International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62351 [15], when released, will be a 
multipart standard developed by the International Electrotechnical Commission.  It will address 
information security for the control of power systems.  There are currently seven parts planned, of which 
one is in draft.  Part 1 of the standard will provide the background on security for power system 
operations and an introduction to the remaining parts of the standard, primarily to introduce the reader to 
various aspects of information security as applied to power system operations. [15]  Part 2 will contain 
definitions of terms and acronyms.  Parts 3 through 6 will cover security requirements for various 
protocols, while Part 7 will address network and system management. [16] 
Status:
Standard - Informative 
Not released - Parts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were submitted as Committee Drafts (CDs) in May 2005. Comments 
from National Committees on the CDs were received and responded to during the last meeting of WG15 
in September.  Parts 3, 4, and 6 have been updated and will then be submitted for CDV (Committee Draft 
Vote).  Part 5 is being updated.  Parts 2 and 7 are moving forward. [16]  The current status of each of the 
parts can be found at Reference [17]. 
IEEE 1402-2000 – IEEE Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security
Scope: Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Guide for Electric Power Substation 
Physical and Electronic Security, IEEE 1402-2000, [18] is a standard sponsored by the Power 
Engineering Society/Substations of IEEE.  This standard identifies and discusses security issues related to 
human intrusion at electric power supply substations.  Various methods and techniques that are being 
used to mitigate both physical and electronic intrusions are also presented. [18]  Although IEEE 1402 is 
primarily concerned with physical security, it also mentions defense against electronic intrusions. [19] 
Status:
Standard – Informative 
Approved – January 30, 2000 
ISA SP99.00.01 - Manufacturing and Control Systems Security – Concepts, Models and 
Terminology 
Scope:  The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society (ISA)  SP99.00.01 [20], when 
released, will address the basic concepts, models, and terminology that form the basis for the other 
standards in the series but will not address guidance in establishing a cyber security program.  It will be 
the first in a series of standards that address the subject of Manufacturing and Control System security. 
Status:
Standard - Normative 
Not released.  Part 1 is currently in draft stage with first ballot scheduled for the first part of 2006. 
ISA SP99.00.02 - Manufacturing and Control Systems Security – Establishing a Manufacturing 
and Control Systems Security Program 
Scope:  ISA SP99.00.02 [21] will focus on establishing a security program for manufacturing and 
control systems.  It will provide practical guidance and direction on how to establish a business case for a 
security program and how to design a security program, tailored to a company’s individual needs.  This 
standard will cover cyber security for manufacturing and control systems as it applies, in the broadest 
possible sense, encompassing all types of manufacturing plants and facilities, as well as other processing 
operations such as utilities (i.e., electric, gas and water), pipelines and transportation systems or other 
industries which use automated or remotely controlled vehicles.  It will be based on function, not 
industry, type of control or other limited views.  Specifically, Manufacturing and Control Systems include 
all systems that can affect or influence the safe, secure and reliable operation of an industrial process.  
Status:
Standard - Normative 
Part 2 is not released.  It is currently in draft stage with first ballot scheduled for the latter part of 2006. 
ANSI/ISA TR99.00.01-2004 - Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems  
Scope:  ISA Technical Report TR99.00.01 [22] provides an evaluation and assessment of several 
categories of electronic security technologies and tools that apply to the Manufacturing and Control 
Systems environment, including development, implementation, operations, maintenance, engineering and 
other user services.  It discusses specific types of applications within each category, the vulnerabilities 
addressed by each type, suggestions for deployment, and known strengths and weaknesses, as well as 
some forms of mitigation for the mentioned risks.  It does not make recommendations of one technology 
over others, but provides recommendations and guidance for using the technologies, as well as 
information to consider when developing a site or corporate security program and plan.  It also provides 
guidance to manufacturers, vendors, and security practitioners and end-user companies on the 
technological options for securing these systems against electronic (cyber) attack.  
Status:
Technical Report 
Approved 10 October 2004   
ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 - Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and 
Control Systems Environment 
Scope:  ISA Technical Report TR99.00.02 [23] provides a framework for developing an electronic 
security program and a recommended organization and structure for a security plan.  It focuses on the 
planning, developing, and implementing activities involved with a comprehensive program for integrating 
security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems environment.  It also gives detailed information 
about the minimum elements to include and guidance on broad policy goals and objectives in areas 
ranging from risk analysis to management of change and compliance auditing.  It also provides guidance 
for auditing a system against the defined electronic security policy to determine security breaches or 
vulnerabilities, and assists in verifying compliance with security policies and procedures. It includes 
guidance on using metrics to measure progress, identify potential pitfalls, and potentially modify the audit 
procedure.
Status:
Technical Report 
Approved 10 October 2004   
When ISA SP99.00.02 is released, this technical report will be inactivated. 
ISO/IEC 17799 – Information Technology – Code of practice for information security 
management 
Scope:  International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/IEC-17799:2005 [24] establishes 
guidelines and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information 
security management in an organization.  The objectives outlined in this standard provide general 
guidance on the commonly accepted goals of information security management. [24]  It offers guidelines 
and voluntary directions for information security management and is meant to provide a high level, 
general description of the areas currently considered important when initiating, implementing or 
maintaining information security in an organization. [25] 
The control objectives presented in this standard are intended to be implemented to meet the 
requirements identified by a risk assessment.  It my also serve as a practical guideline for developing 
organizational security standards and effective security management practices and to help build 
confidence in inter-organizational activities. [24]  It is organized into twelve major sections, each 
covering a different topic, including risk assessment and treatment, security policy, physical and 
environmental security, asset management, etc.   
Status:
Standard - Informative 
Released:  15 June 2005  
ISO/IEC 27001 - Information technology – Security techniques – Information security 
management systems – Requirements 
Scope:  The basic objective of ISO/IEC 27001 [26] is to help establish and maintain an effective 
information security management system, using a continual improvement approach. [27]  It specifies the 
requirements for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and 
improving a documented information security management system within the context of the 
organization’s overall business risks.  It specifies the requirements for the implementation of security 
controls customized to the needs of individual organizations. [26]  Although the standard contains both 
informative and normative sections, the standard is intended to provide normative requirements based on 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 
Status:
Standard - Normative 
Released:  15 October 2005  
NERC 1200 – Urgent Action Standard 1200 – Cyber Security
Scope:  North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), developed the “Urgent Action Cyber 
Security Standard” (NERC 1200) [28] to establish a set of defined security requirements related to the 
energy industry and to reduce risks to the reliability of the bulk electric systems from any compromise of 
critical cyber assets. [28, 29]  NERC 1200 applies to existing entities (such as control areas, transmission 
owners and operators, and generation owners and operators) performing various electric system functions. 
[30]  NERC 1200 addresses cyber security policy, critical cyber assets, electronic and physical security 
perimeter, access controls, monitoring of access, the protection of information, training systems 
management, test procedures, response to incidents, and plans for recovery following an incident.  It was 
developed as temporary standard for a one-year period, to be replaced by Cyber Security Standards, CIP-
002-1 through CIP-009-1.  It has since received extensions until August, 2006. 
Status:
Standard - Normative 
Adopted 13 August 2003 
This standard will be inactivated when the CIP series Cyber Security Standards are released. 
NERC CIP – Cyber Security
Scope:  The NERC CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) series, CIP-002-1 through CIP-009-1, [31] 
will establish standards in eight key areas, designed to protect not only power plants but all other aspects 
of electric utility operations and assets as well.  This standard will include provisions for identifying 
critical cyber assets, developing security management controls, implementing training, identifying and 
implementing perimeter security, implementing a physical security program for the protection of critical 
cyber assets, protecting assets and information within the perimeter, conducting incident reporting and 
response planning, and crafting and implementing recovery plans.  This standard will cover the same 
basic areas covered by the NERC 1200 Standard. [32]  It will include audit measures and levels of non-
compliance that will be tied to penalties. [33] 
Status:
Standard - Normative 
Not released - The committee has decided that a ballot on the revised draft 3 would be held in February 
2006 with expected effective date of June 2006. [34] 
NERC Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector 
Scope:  The “NERC Security Guidelines for the Electrical Sector” [35] describe general approaches, 
considerations, practices, and planning philosophies to be applied in protecting the electric infrastructure 
systems. [36]  They address both physical and cyber security, providing a minimum baseline for secure 
cyber access control across the electric sector.  These guidelines focus on vulnerability and risk 
assessment, emergency plans, continuity of business process, communications, physical security, cyber-
risk management, cyber-access control, cyber-IT firewalls, employment background screening, protecting 
potentially sensitive information, securing remote access to electronic control and protection systems, 
threat and incident reporting, patch management, and control system-business electronic connectivity. 
Their purpose is to provide recommendations to effectively and reliably secure control system networks 
and thereby enhances the security and reliability of the bulk electric system infrastructure. [35]  These 
guidelines are advisory in nature. [36] 
Status:
Guidelines
Released - June 14, 2002 
SPP-ICS - System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems
Scope:  The System Protection Profile (SPP) for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [37], prepared for 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), addresses security requirements needed 
throughout an industrial control system's lifecycle for an entire industrial control system, including 
design, implementation, configuration, maintenance, and decommissioning.  It covers requirements for 
operating policies and procedures, information technology based system components, interfaces and 
interoperability between system components, and the physical environment and protection of the system. 
[37]  It also includes security concepts such as defense in-depth, or layered security, extending from 
industrial process sensors and programmable logic controllers up through the factory control and 
enterprise business hierarchy to the Internet. [38]  It deals with industrial control systems such as SCADA 
systems, distributed control systems, and programmable logic controllers.  Requirements for components 
of the control system, such as industrial controller authentication and sensor authentication, also are 
outlined.  SPP-ICS is a baseline document that states necessary industrial security requirements at an 
implementation-independent level.  System integrators and end-users can apply SPP-ICS to specify 
security functional requirements to procure new systems while vendors can use it to demonstrate 
assurance that their products meet these security requirements. [39] 
Status:
System Protection Profile 
Released May 26, 2004 
SP800-53 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems 
Scope:  NIST Special Publication (SP)800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems, [40] provides guidelines for selecting and specifying security controls for 
information systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal government.  These guidelines 
address the selection and specification of security controls, recommendations for minimum security 
controls, development of assessment methods and procedures for determining security effectiveness, and 
promote a dynamic catalog of security controls to meet changing requirements. [40]  SP800-53 outlines 
the management, operational, and technical safeguards necessary to comply with the Federal Information 
Security Management Act. [41] 
Status:
Guidelines
Released February 2005 
SP800-82 Guide for SCADA and ICS Security  
Scope:   NIST SP 800-82, will provide guidance for establishing secure SCADA and Industrial 
Control Systems while presenting an overview of typical topologies to facilitate the understanding of 
industrial control systems.  It will also identify typical vulnerabilities, threats and consequences while 
providing guidance on security deployment including administrative, physical and technical 
countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. [42] 
Status:
Guidelines
Not released - A Subject Matter Expert draft of SP800-82 is expected shortly [43]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cyber security standards can assist in providing increased security to computer-controlled systems by 
supplying an understanding of areas of concern and how they can be addressed.  There are many aspects 
that come into play when considering the protection of a control system, both physical and cyber.   
This paper reviews several cyber security standards used in control system cyber security.  A review of 
these standards shows both distinct differences as well as areas of overlap in the coverage by the 
standards.  Therefore, a careful examination of the standards should be made before using any given 
standard.
This paper provides a high-level examination of several standards related to process control system cyber 
security, and may be used as a first step towards identifying the control system standards that should be 
applied in protecting a process control system.  It is recommended that those developing control system 
cyber security programs continue exploration of the existing standards as they are in a constant state of 
flux due to the changing level of attack and the changing security environment. 
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